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~i. NICHOLAS GOLO~

SPACE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY - THE NEAR AND DISTANT FUTURE

It is a pleasure to be here today, and take part in your Fall
Conference on the Nation's Space and Space Science Programs . I have
discovered a number of former associates in the Canaveral Council of
Technical Societies, and there is no better way to resume old friendships
than by joining in discussion of a problem of common interest . The
purpose of your Conference -- "to stimulate se.r ious thought and definitive
planning on the . part of government, business and institutions, and a
gen~ral . awareness on the part of the public . . • " in the challenges
posed by.. what you call the "Pace of the Race to Space" -- is indeed such
a problem.
Although the focus of your meeting is on the difficulties and
opportunities facing the State of Florida and the Cape Area particularly,
my assignment from your Executive :Board Chainnan -- Jim Duffett -- is
somewhat broader. As I understand it, my function is to help to supply
a long-range, national rather than regional, technical content for detailed
review of more locally oriented issues . What I have to say is based on
this understanding, and explains the somewhat sweeping .title for these
remarks -- "Space Science and Technology, the Near and Distant Future."
One additional introductory remark before getting down t o businessJ
I am taking at face value your declared interest in "serious thought and
definitive planning. " Thus, I assume that we are here today not as
"cheerleaders" for bigger and more profitable space spectaculars each
fiscal year, but as participants in a genuine effort to be rational in
making more or less educated guesses about what .is likely to be in store
for us because of the "Race to Space."
What do ·I mean by the "near" and by the "distant" future? Events
occurring roughly within the time period needed to attain a successf'ul
manned round trip to the mpon fall within the "near fu~ure " , the "distant
future" is a · somewhat more ccmplex notion. I choose to look at it as
being its~lf divided into two periods : , the end of the first being marked _
in time approximately by a successful manned round trip to Mars, and the
second as including events following that accomplishment. To pin these
notions down to the calendar: the lunar round trip is plw:µied within the
remainder of the decade, so the "near future" is roughly in .1970; it is
· conceivable that the Martian round trip can be acccmplished in the fi~een
to twenty years following, that is, perhaps by 1985 to 1990. Many of us
: here today should be able to participate technically in this adventure;
almost certainly, all of us will participate econcmically by helping to
pay for it . The ensuing period is really the "distant future." I propose
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to speculate with you about each of these three periods in sane detail,
basing my discussion largely on technical considerations. Accordingly,
·my remarks will reflect judgments as to what is likely 'to come out of
either American or non-American space technology, without trying to
guess as to what will be done by whom first. If what I ~ay will be dot!~------
doesn 't agree with your understanding of the content of our national
program, please don't interpret the remark as a recommendation for a
change in the program; it will not be that at all. What follows is purely
my personal guess as to how world technology in this field is likely to
move ahead, and what some of the implications of such progress ·may turn
out to be.
Although the progression of major technical accomplishments leading
to manned exploration on the moon obviously cannot yet be completely
defined, enough experience is available to block out a general outline.
Having acquired the ability to make at will successful manned round trips
to earth orbit, subsequent developments might go like this.
First. Placing men and equipment in earth orbit for prolonged periods,
using either general mission spacecraft or especially designed laboratories
of size and weight allowed·by the then available booster capabilities and
state-of-the-art in rendezvous technology.
The first manned lunar round trip will involve at lea·st seven days, and
the effects on the health and capabilities of the crew under realistically
simulated space conditions will need to be first studied over substantially
longer periods. Similarly, the effects ol' the space environm.ent on canponents playing central roles in system reliability will need to be proved
out by testing in space for periods several times the length of mission
duration requirements. It is possible, of course, that unusually rapid
growth.of confidence in the expected reliability of the systems to be
used. may make the development of orbital techniques for such purposes an
objective following rather than preceding initial attempts for a successful
manned lunar round trip.
Second. Unmanned observation of the moon from low lunar orbits,
and earth recovery 01' instrumentation.
A leisurely approach to the moon mission would include earth recovery
from lunar orbit of animals and observational equipment launched in a
prototype of the capsule to be used for the first manned mission. Such
experiments would provide full duration, realistic testing of the environmental control, guidance, earth re-entry, and landing subsystems without
requi~ing commitment of crews.
However, such experiments would be possible, and would be attempted, only if the developmental philosophy for
the manned lunar landing mission included complete mechnnization of all
required control operations, and employed the crew for observations,
and as a redundant resource to be used only if autcmatic equipment malfunctioned. Whether, and when, such a philosophy will be a reasonable
one to adopt, even for particular phases of the over-all mission, is one
of the most difficult and critical issues in its technical planning.
0
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Third. Manned circumnavigation of the moon followed by repeated
orbital flights around the moon prior to earth return.
Since the interva1 fran beginning of fina1 descent to the ·1unar surface
to lunar take-off for earth return, will involve t!!-:' greatest system complexities and risks in· the final mission, such experiments can probably be
carried out substantially earlier than manned landings. Because these
exercises will be spectacular in themselves; can be used, for example, to
provide man-supervised, high-resolution, photography of the lunar surface
for improved engineering of landing techniques and guidance procedures; and
because they will test crews Jointly with much of over-all systems equipment,
without subjecting them to the maximum risks of the mission, it is most
likely that they will. be undertaken.
Fourth. Development of a comprehensive and detailed operational
plan for lunar exploration.

1 ;
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It is very likely that detailed photographic and radiation instrumentation coverage of most of the lunar surface will have been obtained prior
to the manned landing attempt. In view of the great incentive provided by
recognition of priority in discovery, and because extensive manned exploration of the lunar surface will be both extremely hazardous and costly, a
great deal of analytical scientific effort, based on the then available
data, is likely to be invested in optimum plans for locating instrumentation
on the lunar surface, obtaining samples of surface material, making borings
or seismic measurements, and so on. The principal objective of a largescale effort along these lines will be to insure that most of what it
is desirable to·learn in detail about the moon can be learned quickly,
at low cost, and with minimum need for human presence on the lunar surface.
Also, it seems certain that development of equipment providing for automated
data· acquisition, processing and transmission in unmanned lunar exploration
procedures, will be one of the principal technological challenges of the
years inunediately following the successful manned lunar landing. In spite
of all the exciting, romantic connotations of the words "moon" and
"exploration," it is likely that the logic of high hazards and costs will
canpel severe limitation of human participation in lunar exploration, once
the drama of the first manned landing is behind us.
Fifth. Establishment of an eventually urunanned lunar base, principally
for astronomical observations.

.

A great deal of speculative discussion has appeared about the early
establishment of manned lunar bases, particularly for military purposes,
once we have learned how to carry out safe manned round trips to the moon.
I~ MB\Y' be worthwhile to suggest in passing why much of such speculation
MB\Y' be somewhat unrealistic. The Apollo mission can be accomplished with
a ratio of total launch weight to lunar landing weight of about 120 to l,
and to earth return landing weight of about 6oo to 1. Past experience
suggests that the launch cost ·of each complete system for a round-trip
flight is not likely to be significantly less than about $10 per pound
at launch. Assuming t'hat 10~ of the Apollo• s weight can be used for
payloads on the return leg of the trip, it will then cost some $1,200 per
pound to deliver supplies fron earth to the moon, and some $60,000 per
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pound to bring materials from the moon to eerth. With such exchange
ratios to cope with, it is difficult to see et this time vhat economic
or other purely practical motivations will justify large scale, continuing
manned luner travel once the initial goal of the project is attained. The
concept of e luner beee for purely scientific purposes, end·one not necessarily requiring human participation in operating it, is accordingly about
the only one thet mekee sense et thie time. The most probable fl.Ulction
of such e base vould be to house en eetronomicel observatory, with facilities for fully automatic date ecquiaition, processing and transmission to
eerth. Even then, it is not nov obvious that equivalent scientific re8ulte,
et relatively much lower costs, could not be obtained from earth-orbiting
astronomical observatories, especially after aeversl generations of evolution in systems development.
These few charecteriatic8 of technological developments which may
dominate the remainder of this decade vill probably make much heavier
demands on the human and materiel resources available to us or to our
competitors than is commonly assumed. Thus, it is difficult to essess
objectively and reliably, at this time, the scale of the effort ultimately
- .~ be absorbed by the menned lunar landing program, either in terms of
·rained manpower or of other needs since many technical uncertainties still
remain whose effect on program costs end schedule time is impossible to
assess without more experiebce. Also, we are still too early in the developmental stages of most of the hardwere to be used for manned space flight
to guess with reasonable confidence hov much ayatem testing and time vill
be needed for the discovery and correction of developmental errors we must
assume will be made. In addition, there ere somewhat leas obvious limitations to the scale to which our over-ell apace 'effort can be built up and
which we cannot ignore in attempting to establish realistic bases for planning in various contexts. For example, in e study submitted to the House
Committee on Science end Astronautics (authorship not specified in the
published record) et the time of its hearings on NASA's 1963 appropriations
authorization, it is predicted that total U.S. research end development
expenditures for space, beginning with $2.5 billion for 1962, vill be {in
billions) as follows: $6.2 in 1964; $9.3 in 1966; $11.7 in 1968; and $13.0
in 1970. To check if these estimates are realizable, let's look at just
one aspect of the assumed rate of growth--the effect on the utilization
of scientists and engineers available in the United States during this period.
First, it hes been reliably estimeted that in 1962 at least one-third
of American scientists engaged in research and development are concerned
with the science and technology of space. Also, ve know that the total
pool of available technical manpower in the U.S. is growing et a rate of
about 6% per year. A simple calculation then shows that if the total
space research and development budget were to grow by a factor of somewhat
more then 5 betwe~n now end 1970, as is predicted by the study referred to,
end, if the space program's utilization of technical manpower per budget
dollar did not change too redicelly during thie period, and there is no
particular reason to believe that it would, then, the space program would
be using in 1970 more then ell of the then available technical manpower
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for research and development· in the

u.s .

The principal point of this example is it shows that limits exist both
to the rate of annual growth of the space program, and to.the absolute
level of effort that it is _probably practical for it to reach, no matter
how enthusiastic~lly willing we might .be to push the "Pace of the Race to
Space·."
Furthermore, let us recall that the main reason for the national
importance of the space program is to help demonstrate to the world at
large the dominating .role our society plays in science and technology.
But we have been internationally challenged in fields other than space-for example, in our industrial efficiency as reflected in the ability of
our goods to compete in world markets, or by the rate of growth in our
per capita and over-all industrial productivity. Clear4', these challenges
are no .less vital, even if less visible, than primacy in space. But to meet
them also, we must increase substantially the level of our research and
______ ·
development effort in industry generally, and therefore the incentives for-able scientists and engineers to enter such work. Only by doing so will
we be able to ensure that other sectors of our economy mak.e their needed
contributions to the vitality of our total technological strength.
Let us now turn, somewhat more briefly, to the likely problems and
technical developments of interest in the next major period in space technology- - manned landings on, and exploration of, the planets.
First, technically, the most significant difference between the planetary and lunar missions will be in the time taken for the round trip, and
in engineering out the complications that this longer mission time in space
will induce from a reliability point of view.

.,

The duration of a planetary round trip will be several tens of times
that of a lunar trip, of the order of' one year or so in length. In comparison to the lunar mission, it will therefore require proportionate increases
in the mean time to failure of all equipments employed. Also, the dangers
of meteoroid damage, and of excessive radiation dosage to the crew, will
increase proportionately to mission time. Since neither of these risks haG
yet been explored quantitatively with any thoroughness, little can now be
said about the weight of shielding required to insure crew survival from
either danger. .Furthennore, exposure for a year to the confinement and
stresses of a space journey will also no doubt require that the ere~ be
provided with elbow room and supporting facilities on a scale substantially
more generous than is currently assumed adequate :for the week to 10 days
occupancy of the Apollo capsule during the lunar trip. Combining in a
general wa:y the weight requirements for equipment redundancy to insure
reliability, for needed meteoroid and radiation shielding, and for crew
facilities and supplies for a year's journey, let's assume that the weight
in earth .orbit of a Martian Apollo 3-man system, on its return from a
Martian circumnavigation trip, ·will be some 10 times that of the lunar
Apollo system--say, 120,000 pounds. This number in hand, we can estimate
the vehicle weights required at launch from earth, and on light-o:ff from
earth-orbit, for alternative types of propulsion systems which might be
available for such a journey: (1) for an all-chemical system we will need
about 8 million pounds of vehicle ·weight in earth orbit, and about 200 millio11
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pounds at launch on earth; (2) for a chemical propulsion $ystem in the first
stage, and nuclear systems for the remaining stages, we will need about 1-1/2
million pounds in earth orbit, and about 45 million pounds on take-off fran
earth.
The launch weight of a Saturn·C-5 rocket, together with its PS\Y'lOad for
the lunar round trip, will be about 6 million pounds. The Martian manned
circumnavigation problem-- and this is less demanding than a manned Martian
landing--if it is executed with all-chemical systems, will then require the
equivalent of 34 C-5 rockets per trip; if such a journey is executed with
nuclear-powered upper stages, the earth take-off .requirement will be the
weight equivalent of some 9 C-5 rockets per trip.
Although this is scmetimes asstuned, it is not necessarily likely that
the cost of propulsion and payload systems for planetary exploration ~ill
be less per pound of weight at take-off than for those used for lunar
exploration. However, let us nevertheless assume that the cost per pound
launched for planetary trips will only be half as great as for lunar ones-even so,·at least one-qua~er of a billion dollars per Martian circumnavigation trip will be required. Evidently, such journeys are not likely to
be undertaken lightly or'too often.
In addition; the foregoing discussion suggests that the choice of
propulsion systems, and of operational methods, to be developed for planetary
exploration will necessarily be a major problem of concern during the latter.
years of this decade. In view of the magnitude ol: the developmental problems
to be faced in planetary exploration, its cost·in technical manpower and in
natural resources will need to be estimated and scheduled in advance·with
more than usual care; its execution will call Tor levels of detail and comprehensiveness in planning and in coordination, at both the national and
industrial levels, without peacetime precedent; new techniques for organization and management of the effort wi.Ll probably need to be invented.
Second, the incentives for aut.omated L1strumentatlo!.i systems to observe
and explore planetary environments aud surl'aces will clearly be even gre.ater
than for the lunar exploration prob.Lem.
Since, in fact, little can be done by men in routine observation ant..
measurement which cannot be better ea.rried ou·c by instruments, and because
of the extra?rdinary costs ~d haz&.rds.in.transporting equipments as fragile
as men over 1nterplanetary distances, .Lt is highly probable that manned
planetary journeys, OAce the large gains from the first few successful row1d
trips are behind us, will be substantially rarer even than lunar ones. It is
extremely unlikely that the frequency will soon approach the one per week 50
~requently estimated in aerospace contractors' brochures.
In this connection, it is also important to keep in mind that lunar a.&~u
planetary exploration cannot now, or for the foreseeable future, be justifiea
on economic grounds. No commercially valuable materials ·now known and likely
to be found or "produced" els~where in the solar system, can concefvably have
a cost-per-pound on earth after a lunar or planetary trip which will be less
than the cost-per-pound for the production of their equivalents on earth. The
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only available justifications for these programs are the advancement they
contribute to scientific knowledge and the contributions they make to
national prestige. However, the scientific problems whose probability
of solution would seem to be appreciably enhanced by lunar and planetary
exploration are those related to the origin and evolution of the solar
system, and to the origin and evolution of life in it. To what degree
manned Journeys to various parts of the solar system will be needed to
advance scientific understanding of these problems is, however, still an
open question. But, as suggested previously, en.onnous incentives, because
of the high costs and high hazards, will exist to devise instrumentation,
and design experiments, which will provide needed data from the lunar and
planetary environments with minimal physical involvement of men in space
travel. It then follows that one of the principal economically useful
"spill-overs" of the "race to space" might be acceleration in the development of automated instrumentation systems and tec~iques for use on earth.
Paradoxically, thus, the primary motivations leading to such developments
will be the economies to be realized by keeping men out of space!
I now want to spen4 a little time speculating about the "distant
future" of the program. · In some industrial reports I have seen, this
period is referred to as the period of "Universe .Exploration" and it is
assumed to begin about 1990, the year by which the technology of controlled
thennonuclear reactions is assumed by some to have been mastered for use
on earth, as well as successfully applied to the somewhat more denanding
constraints of rocket engineering.
I can think of no better way to discuss ideas about manned space
travel outside the solar system than to introduce the elegant and entertaining analysis made by Purcell in his Brook.haven Lecture. This lecture
should be required reading for all budding space enthusiasts. 'rhe point
of bis argument, for our purposes·, can be restated in the following way:
First, the principal argument in favor of manned travel outside the
solar system is to find and explore other planetary systems having environmental conditions not incompatible with life;
Second, a scientific analysis using all of the available astronomical
evidence, direct and indirect, suggests that there i.s a high probability
of finding planetary systems, with general environmental conditions approaching those on earth, within the distances of about 12 light years from earth;
Third, assume that we have a i'usio11 reactor coverting hydrogen to
helium with perfect efficiency, and that we have mastered the technology
of expelling the helium from the vehiclE: in one direction wl th the maximum
velocity allowed by th~ Energy release of the reactioi1; then, using a
"round-trip time minimizing trajectory on which we accelerate t.o a maximum
velocity of 99fo. that of light, we could make a round trip to a planetary
system 12 light years away in 28 earth years, during which the astronauts
would have aged only some 10 years;
1

'

I

Fourth, we could have used a lower maximum velocity, but theJ the
trip would have taken longer; or we could have accelerated to a higher
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speed"but then the launch problem would have become even more difficult,
since:
Fifth, using a theoretically perfect rocket design, the above
journex would require a ratio of the initial to the final payload mass of
4 x 10j6. · Assuming that the capsule system carryi~ the intrepid astronauts
~eighs 10 tons on arriving back on earth, it then readily follows that the
take-off mass of the rocket would need to be 20 billion times the weight
of the sun! A substantial launch problem, even at Canaveral!
Of course, the real space enthusiast will not be deterred by this
line of argument. He will say, we should use a rocket burning matter with
"anti-matter." Purcell, too, thought of this argument. He redid the calculation with this "fuel" and found that the initial to final mass ratio does
indeed become much more reasonable, only 4o,ooo or so, so that the initial
weight of the rocket will need to be "only"4oo,ooo tons-- that is 200,000
tons of matter and 200 ,000 tons of "anti-matter" --no mean trick for the
advanced technology of the 1990's, even disregarding radiation shielding
problems which Purcell indicates will be substantially greater for the earth
than for the crew! It turns out that this "high enerSY fueled" rocltet will
radiate, for sometime after take-off, more energy than the earth receives
from the Sun, but all thisQradiation would unfortunately be gamma rays
rather than Florida sunshine!
It will be sometime before J.'ederal fiscal officers begin issuinc
RFP' s to procure "nonmaterial" bottles ·to hold the "anti-matter" for such
"second generation" fusion powered rockets.
One of the most reliable assertions one can make about the fm,ure
of the space program in general is that our industry nL'(.:d Hot concera its1:· ~f,
for sometime to come, with the problems or building vehicles for manned
exploration of other solar systems. For the time being, and without endati6cring our international prcst.i.~e, we can sai'ely leave such bola a.nd venture~J .. ;e
undertakings to other cow1tries. Whatever exploration of the Uui verse
beyond the solar system will be eventually undertaken, even in the distan7..
future, it will almost cc·rtainly conslst, us Purcell also suggests, o!'
building bigger and uetter radio te.i..~:scopcLl nere, on earth--for the prospect
of eventually discovering radio evid~nce Ot' greater intelligence and knowledge elsewhere. 'rhcre wo~1ld be lit.t le point in building telescopes for
this purpose on the moon, and no~ on or.her planets, since our atmosphere
has a radio window of com1'ortable width, which any culture in~erested in
transmitting inl'unnation over the interstellar distances would surely know
is available.
In conclusion, let me now make just the following points:
First, insofar as the inunediate .i.'uture is concern.ed, the space progrB.i:-;
is likely to pick up some additional momentum, and probably absorb still
more of our technical manpower pool as well as of other resources ..
Canaveral, and Florida in g~neral, will necessarily acquire heavier workloads attributable directly to expansion i~ this program.
Second, in the somewhat longer run, the "Pace of the rlace to Space ''
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will necessarily level off, not because of diminished enthusiasm, or of
shortages in funds, or lack of national resources in general, but simply
because the nation has other pressing tasks for its scientists and engineers
which are likely to become even more urgent as time goes.on. In view of
the high proportion of trained men already committed to this program, the
time of this leveling off may not be too far ahead.
Third, eventually, in view of the inevitably high costs and hazards
of manned space travel, incentives for automation of lunar and planetary
exploration will become very great. It is perhaps in this area that the
space program will, in time, produce the most important "spill-over"
benefits to the national economy in general. It wvuld seem that, at the
corporate level of planning, for exmaple, the development of competence
in the scientific disciplines and techniques relevant to such work would
be the soundest approach to important long-run participation in the space
program, as well as in the general industrial progress it will tend to
stimulate.

..

Fourth, it begins to become clear that a problem of transcendent
importance in long-range planning l'or our economy as a whole--that is,
not only for the central national government, but for industry and local
government as well~s that of how to insure that increasingly greater
proportions of our ablest youth are motivated'to undertake, a.rrl to survive,
the rigQrs of training needed to enter professional fields in science and
technology, and then are provided the incentives to remain in such work.
There appears available no route other than this to insure that the Nation
is able both to cope with, and to take advantage of, the rapidly accelerating growth of science and its technological consequences.
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